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Notes
The Picture Worth Ten Thousand Words:
Non-Audio Surveillance Videotapes Now
Statements Under Section 287.215 of
Missouri's Workers' Compensation Law
Fisher v. Waste Management ofMissouril
I. INTRODUCTION
When Michael Fisher filed his workers' compensation claim, he was
unaware that his employer, Waste Management of Missouri, had been secretly
videotaping his physical activities.2 Not surprisingly, the submission of the
surveillance videotapes at Fisher's compensation hearing significantly
contributed to the reduction of his disability ruling The admission of these
surveillance videotapes is, subsequently, the focus of this Note.
Missouri law has long held that a non-auditory surveillance videotape was
not a "statement" under Section 287.215 of its workers' compensation law.' As
a result, non-disclosure of such videotapes did not bar their admissibility at a
compensation hearing, until now. Disregarding precedent of the Eastern
District Court of Appeals,6 the Missouri Supreme Court held in Fisher v. Waste
Management of Missouri' that a non-auditory surveillance videotape is a
"statement" under Section 287.215 of Missouri's workers' compensation law.'
This Note will examine the meaning of a "statement" under Missouri's workers'
compensation law and the process through which an employee can obtain such
statements prior to a compensation hearing.9 Functionally, Fisher now requires
an employer to produce any surveillance videotapes it may possess if the tapes
1. 58 S.W.3d 523 (Mo. 2001).
2. See id.
3. See infra notes 30-31 and accompanying text.
4. This standard began with the inception of Chapter 287 of Missouri's workers'
compensation statute in 1959. See Erbschloe v. Gen. Motors Corp., 823 S.W.2d 117,
119 (Mo. Ct. App. 1992).
5. Fisher, 58 S.W.3d at 527.
6. See Erbschloe, 823 S.W.2d at 119.
7. 58 S.W.3d 523 (Mo. 2001).
8. Fisher, 58 S.W.3d at 527.
9. See infra Part III.
1
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depict the employee, and the employee makes request to the employer to
produce any statements.'"
II. FACTS AND HOLDING
Michael Fisher hauled trash for Waste Management of Missouri ("Waste
Management")."I On June 18, 1997, and again on September 18, 1997, Fisher
injured his right shoulder and arm while lifting heavy trash cans. As a result
of these injuries, Fisher filed a workers' compensation claim against his
employer, Waste Management.' 3 Shortly thereafter, and unknown to Fisher,
Waste Management began to take non-auditory surveillance videotapes of
Fisher's physical activities. 4 The surveillance videotapes at issue depicted
Fisher performing activities incident to his employment without physical
limitation.'5
In preparation for his upcoming compensation hearing, Fisher's attorney
requested Waste Management to disclose all "statements""' made by Fisher,
pursuant to Missouri Revised Statutes Section 287.215.'1 Section 287.215'"
essentially requires an employer to disclose all statements upon proper request.' 9
Waste Management, however, did not disclose the surveillance videotapes it
possessed upon Fisher's request.20
10. Fisher, 58 S.W.3d at 523.
11. Id. at 524.
12. Fisher v. Waste Mgmt. ofMo., No. ED 78091,2001 WL 69249, at * 1 (Mo. Ct.
App. E.D. Jan. 30, 2001), rev'd, 58 S.W.3d 523 (Mo. 2001).
13. Id.
14. See Fisher, 58 S.W.3d at 524.
15. Id. (Limbaugh, C.J., dissenting).
16. Fisher, 2001 WL 69249, at *1. For several definitions of "statement," see
infra note 92 and accompanying text.
17. Id. The court recognized two possible methods for discovering the videotapes
under Missouri's workers' compensation laws. Id. at **3-4. The first method,
authorized by Section 287.560, is to depose the employer and use a subpoena duces
tecum to compel the production of evidence, similar to that of a civil proceeding. Id. at
*3. The second method, utilized in the instant case, is to request all "statements" as
authorized by Section 287.215. Id. at *4. For further discussion on Section 287.215, see
infra Part III(A).
18. For text of Missouri Revised Statutes Section 287.215, see infra note 46 and
accompanying text.
19. Mo. REv. STAT. § 287.215 (2000).
20. See Fisher, 2001 WL 69249, at *1
[Vol. 67
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At Fisher's compensation hearing, two physicians testified by deposition
about the extent of Fisher's injuries.2 Their diagnoses varied greatly.' In
addition to the medical testimony of these experts, Waste Management attempted
to offer into evidence the non-auditory surveillance videotapes of Fisher.' The
administrate law judge ("ALr') excluded the surveillance videotapes, holding
that the videotapes qualified as "statements" under Section 287.215.1 The
videotapes, therefore, should have been disclosedpursuant to Fisher's discovery
request. 5 The AL went on to conclude that Fisher sustained a "[thirty] percent
permanent partial disability" to his shoulder.26
The Labor and Industrial Relations Commission, however, overruled the
AL's exclusion of the surveillance videotapes.27 The Commission held that the
videotapes were not statements under Section 287.215' and admitted three
videotapes into evidence.29 Relying "primarily"3 on these videotapes, the
Commission reduced Fisher's disability award from thirty to ten percent.3'
On appeal to the Missouri Court of Appeals for the Eastern District, Fisher
contended that the surveillance videotapes were "statements" within the meaning
of Section 287.215.32 Therefore, Fisher argued, the videotapes should have been
excluded from the Commission's review because Waste Management failed to
produce the videotapes upon request.33 Fisher further alleged that the definition
of "statement" contained in Missouri Rule of Civil Procedure 56.01(b)(3)1
21. Fisher, 58 S.W.3d at 524. Specifically, the first physician, Dr. J.H. Morrow,
testified that Fisher sustained a forty-five percent "permanent partial disability to the right
shoulder." Fisher, 2001 WL 69249, at *1. The second, Dr. Michael P. Nogalski,
Fisher's treating physician, testified that Fisher sustained a three percent disability. Id.
Upon a third, and final diagnosis on July 29, 1998, Dr. Nogalski diagnosed Fisher with
"mild chronic rotator cuff tendonitis." Id.
22. See supra note 21 and accompanying text.





28. Fisher v. Waste Mgmt. of Mo., No. ED 78091, 2001 WL 69249, at *1 (Mo.
Ct. App. E.D. Jan. 30, 2001), rev'd, 58 S.W.3d 523 (Mo. 2001).
29. Id.
30. Fisher, 58 S.W.3d at 524.
31. Id.
32. Fisher, 2001 WL 69249, at *2.
33. Id.
34. Mo. R. Civ. P. 56.01(b)(3) provides, in part:
A party may obtain without the required showing a statement concerning the
action or its subject matter previously made by that party. For purpose of this
paragraph, a statement previously made is: (a) a written statement signed or
3
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should apply to Section 287.215. 3" Rejecting these arguments, the Eastern
District affirmed the Commission's ruling and held that the surveillance
videotapes were not statements as the term is used under the workers'
compensation statute.36 Fisher subsequently appealed to the Missouri Supreme
Court.
3 7
The Missouri Supreme Court granted transfer, limiting its consideration to
the "question of law relating to [the] admissibility of the [surveillance]
videotapes"3 under the meaning of "statement" in Section 287.215." Utilizing
a "pragmatic" approach,' the Missouri Supreme Court reversed the ruling of the
Eastern District.4 ' In so doing, the court held that a non-audio surveillance
videotape constitutes a "statement" within Section 287.215.42 Such a holding,
the court noted, "fits the legislative purpose... under chapter 287... to give
employees expeditious and simple means of compensation."43 Consequently, the
court held that a surveillance videotape that is not disclosed upon an employee's
request for a "statement" under Section 287.215 is inadmissible at any hearing."
IlI. LEGAL BACKGROUND
There are now two mechanisms for discovering a surveillance videotape
under Missouri's workers' compensation laws: Missouri Revised Statutes
otherwise adopted or approved by the person making it, or (b) a stenographic,
mechanical, electrical, audio, video, motion picture yr other recording, or a
transcription thereof, of the party or of a statement made by the party and
contemporaneously recorded.
Mo. R. Civ. P. 56.01(b)(3) (2002) (emphasis added).
The Missouri Supreme Court has noted that Rule 56.01's definition of statement is a
product of its "effort to accommodate the General Assembly's enactment of S.B. 127 in
1989." State ex rel. Mo. Pac. R.R. v. Koehr, 853 S.W.2d 925, 926 (Mo. 1993).
35. Fisher, 2001 WL 69249, at *4.
36. Id.
37. Fisher v. Waste Mgmt. of Mo., 58 S.W.3d 523, 524 (Mo. 2001).
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 525. While the court noted that, "pragmatism... [did] not wholly govern
[its] decision," the court's holding, as discussed infra Part V, suggests otherwise. Id. at
525.
41. Id. at 525-27.
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Sections 287.215 and 287.560." The following will describe these two methods,
and the precedent elaborating the definition of a "statement" under each.
A. Section 287.215
The first method is to request all "statements" as authorized by Section
287.215.1 That sectionprovides, inpart, "no statement in writing made or given
by an injured employee... shall be admissible in evidence, used or referred to
in any manner at any hearing or action... unless a copy thereof is given or
furnished [to] the employee."'47 As is evidentby the statutory language, ifa party
does not disclose all statements upon proper request, those statements are
inadmissible as evidence in any hearing.48 Section 287.215 does not, however,
provide an internal definition of what qualifies as a statement.4 9 Nor does this
section indicate whether a surveillance videotape constitutes a statement, thereby
requiring its disclosure upon request.5 0 This issue was first encountered thirty-
three years after the adoption of Chapter 287 by the Eastern District of the
Missouri Court of Appeals."'
In 1992, the Missouri Court of Appeals for the Eastern District held that
non-auditory surveillance videotapes were not statements under Section 287.215
of Missouri's workers' compensation law."2 Indeed, the court held that Section
287.215 "clearly addresses only statements. ' 3 In Erbschloe v. GeneralMotors,
an employee filed a workers' compensation claim alleging that he sustained an
45. Fisher, 58 S.W.3d at 525.
46. Fisher, 58 S.W.3d at 525. Missouri Revised Statues Section 287.215 states:
No statement in writing made or given by an injured employee, whether taken
and transcribed by a stenographer, signed or unsigned by the injured
employee, or any statement which is mechanically or electronically recorded,
or taken in writing by another person, or otherwise preserved, shall be
admissible in evidence, used or referred to in any manner at any hearing or
action to recover benefits under this law unless a copy thereof is given or
firnished the employee, or his dependents in case of death, or their attorney,
within fifteen days after written request for it by the injured employee, his
dependents in case of death, or by their attorney.
Mo. REV. STAT. § 287.215 (2000) (emphasis added).
47. Id. (emphasis added).
48. Id. Specifically, Section 287.215 states that an employer must furnish a copy
of the statement "within fifteen days after written request" by an injured employee. Id.
49. See id.
50. Fisher, 58 S.W.3d at 525.
51. See Erbschloe v. Gen. Motors, 823 S.W.2d 117 (Mo. Ct. App. 1992).
52. Id. at 119 (emphasis added).
53. Id. (emphasis added). This ruling closely mirrors the facts of Fisher.
5
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injury while lifting an object at work.54 Prior to the compensation hearing, the
employee requested that his employer disclose all statements pursuant to Section
287.215."s At the hearing, over the employee's objection, the employer
introduced non-auditory surveillance videotapes of the employee.-6 Based
partially on the videotapes, the ALJ found the employee's testimony
"incredible."57 In allowing the admission of the videotapes, the ALJ ruled that
the videotapes were not a "statement" under Section 287.215.58 Consequently,
the ALJ denied the employee compensation.5 9 This ruling was then upheld by
the Labor and Industrial Relations Commission, afflirmed by the circuit court,
and confirmed by the Eastern District.'
In reaching its decision, the Erbschloe court found no authority supporting
the employee's contention that a videotape is a statement within the meaning of
Section 287.215.61 Consequently, the court held that non-auditory surveillance
videotapes are not "statements" under Section 287.215.62 As a result, prior to the
holding in Fisher, an employee's request of a "statement" pursuant to Section
287.215 did not obligate the employer to produce a surveillance videotape.63
Still, even under this holding, employees seeking to discover whether their
employer had made surveillance videotapes were not without recourse.64
Discovery of a non-auditory surveillance videotape is possible under Missouri
Revised Statutes Section 287.560.6'
B. Section 287.560
The second discovery mechanism available under Missouri's workers'
compensation law is a deposition and subpoena duces tecum,66 as authorized by
Section 287.560.67 While Section 287.560, like Section 287.215, does not






60. Id. at 118-19.
61. Id. at 119.
62. Id.
63. See id.
64. See infra notes 66-81 and accompanying text.
65. See infra note 67 and accompanying text.
66. A subpoena duces tecum is defined as "[a] subpoena ordering the witness to
appear and to bring specified documents or records." BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 1440
(7th ed. 1999).
67. Fisher v. Waste Mgmt. of Mo., 58 S.W.3d 523, 525 (Mo. 2001). Section
[Vol. 67
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provide an internal definition of "statement," a precise definition does exist.68
To provide a definition of "statement," the Missouri Supreme Court in
McConaha v. Allen69 incorporated the definition of statement from Missouri Rule
of Civil Procedure 56.0170 into the permissible scope of discovery available
under Section 287.560.7' Rule 56.01 specifically provides that a statement
includes surveillance videotapes.72 The McConaha court's reasoning for
integrating this definition is based wholly on the language of Section 287.560.' 3
The language of this section of the workers' compensation law specifically
authorizes a party to use a deposition in workers' compensation hearings "in like
manner" to those in a civil case.74 Since Rule 56.01 specifies the general scope
of discovery in matters of civil procedure, the court reasoned that the rule also
controls what is discoverable under Section 287.560. 71 Consequently, a
surveillance videotape may be discovered by using a subpoena duces tecum
during a Section 287.560 deposition.76 This definition of "statement," however,
287.560 authorizes a party to "compel the attendance of witnesses and the production of
books and papers, and at his own cost to take and use depositions in like manner as in
civil cases in the circuit court." Mo. Rev. Stat. § 287.560 (2000).
68. See State ex rel. Mo. Pac. R.R. v. Koehr, 853 S.W.2d 925,926-27 (Mo. 1993).
69. 979 S.W.2d 188 (Mo. 1998).
70. For the definition of "statement" under Rule 56.01(b)(3), see supra note 34.
In Koehr, the court noted that a"statement" as defined by Rule 56.01 is at "variance with
the standard dictionary definition." Koehr, 853 S.W.2d at 926. As such, a contrary
internal definition will supersede the commonly accepted dictionary definition ofa term.
Id. (citing In re Estate of Hough, 457 S.W.2d 687, 691 (Mo. 1970)). For an interesting
analysis of Rule 56.01 and Missouri's treatment of surveillance evidence see Kenneth E.
Siemens, The Discoverablity of Personal Injury Surveillance and Missouri's Work
Product Doctrine, 57 Mo. L. REV. 871 (1992).
71. McConaha, 979 S.W.2d at 189. The McConaha court specifically held that
Section 287.560 authorizes the use of a subpoena duces tecum under Rule 57.09(b). Id.;
see also Mo. REV. STAT. § 287.560 (2000).
72. Koehr, 853 S.W.2d at 926-27; see also Giddens v. Kansas City S. Ry., 29
S.W.3d 813, 819 (Mo. 2000).
73. See McConaha, 979 S.W.2d at 189-90; see also Mo. REV. STAT. § 287.560
(2000).
74. See McConaha, 979 S.W.2d at 188 (citing Mo. REV. STAT. § 287.560).
Missouri Rule of Civil Procedure 57.09(b) governs the use of a subpoena for taking
depositions in civil cases. Rule 57.09(b) provides, that "[a] subpoenamay also command
the person to whom it is directed to produce the books, papers, documents, or tangible
things designated therein." Mo. R. Civ. P. 57.09(b).
75. McConaha, 979 S.W.2d at 189.
76. Fisher v. Waste Mgmt. of Mo., 58 S.W.3d 523, 525 (Mo. 2001) (citing
McConaha, 979 S.W.2d at 188 (articulating that surveillance videotapes are discoverable
through a subpoena duces tecum in a workers' compensation hearing because of Section
287.560's specific reference to civil depositions under Rule 56.01)).
7
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is subject to one important limitation." The McConaha court expressly limited
this definition of a "statement" to supplement only Section 287.560, andno other
statute.78
Based on the McConaha holding, it is clear that an employer is obligated
to disclose a surveillance videotape when an employee issues a subpoena
requesting the production of any statements during a deposition proceeding. 79
By the terms of McConaha, however, this interpretation of "statement" was not
incorporated into the request procedure under Section 287.215."0 As a result of
these two discovery mechanisms and interpretive case law, in a workers'
compensation claim, surveillance videotapes were discoverable under a request
for a statement only through the deposition process of Section 287.560 but not
through a written request under Section 287.215."
IV. INSTANT DECISION
A. The Majority
In Fisher, the Missouri Supreme Court considered whether a non-auditory
surveillance videotape constitutes a "statement" under Section 287.215 of
Missouri's workers' compensation law. 2 After briefly revisiting the facts ofthe
case, the majority began its analysis by expressing, for "consistency," a
"desirable" meaning of the word "statement" as it is used in both Sections
287.215 and 287.560.83 Recognizing that "pragmatism, consistency and
77. See infra note 78 and accompanying text.
78. See McConaha, 979 S.W.2d at 189 (holding that Rule 56.01 is applicable only
to Section 287.560 because the statute requires depositions to be taken "in the same
manner as civil depositions").
79. Id.
80. See id. at 189.
81. See supra notes 45-80 and accompanying text.
82. Fisher v. Waste Mgmt. of Mo., 58 S.W.3d 523 (Mo. 2001).
83. Id. at 525. For a discussion of the methods of discovery, see supra Part III.
The court also discussed the legislatively enacted definition of "statement" in 1989.
Fischer, 58 S.W.3d at 525. The court found, however, that without specific reference,
this definition does not change or modify Section 287.215. Id. The court also noted that
"MO. CONST. [art.] III, [§] 28 prohibits the general assembly from amending statutes
without setting forth in full the statutes so amended." Id. at 525 n.3 (citing Sours v.
State, 603 S.W.2d 592, 599 (Mo. 1980)).
[Vol. 67
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convenience do not wholly govern"" its decision, the court began stating that its
holding was "entirely dependent upon the words of the statute.""
Attempting to discern the meaning of Section 287.215, the court examined
both the legislative intent and purpose of the workers' compensation statute. 6
The court began by analyzing the legislative intent of Section 287.215.17 The
court noted that, in Missouri, while legislative intent is "derived from the
statute's words 'used in their plain and ordinary meaning,"' 8 it must also
consider the statute's "over-all scheme" 9 as established by the legislature."
Although the original enactment of Section 287.215 did not define the word
"statement," the court found its language "indicated a broad meaning."" The
court turned to the 1950 edition of Webster's Second International Dictionary,
which defines "statement" as the "[a]ct of stating, reciting, or presenting, orally
or on paper; as, the statement of a case.., an embodiment in words of facts or
opinions; a... report."' Focusing on this definition, the court found that Waste
Management's surveillance videotapes were "certainly a 'report' on [Fisher's]
physical condition."'93 Finding that "there is no question that information is
conveyed in this report,"94 the court next examined whether Fisher in fact made
84. Fisher, 58 S.W.3d at 525. The majority stated that "the pragmatic choice...
is bolstered by the fact that a request for a statement under section 287.215 is far easier
and less expensive than using the deposition and subpoena procedure of section
287.590." Id.
85. Id. at 524-25.
86. Id. at 526-27.
87. Id. at 526.
88. Id. (quoting Budding v. SSM Healthcare Sys., 19 S.W.3d 678, 680 (Mo.
2000)).
89. Fisher, 58 S.W.3d at 526.
90. Id. The majority found that changes in the original version of Section 287.215
in 1965 and 1973 expanded the statute to incorporate "technology unknown in 1959,
such as videotape, and is broadened to include 'any statement ... mechanically or
electrically recorded.., or otherwise preserved."' Id. at 526 n.4. For a discussion ofthis
statute's construction see infra Part V.
91. Fisher, 58 S.W.3d at 526.
92. Id. (quoting WEBSTER'SNEWINTERNATIONALDICTIONARY2461 (2ded. 1950))
(internal quotation marks omitted). The court found unhelpful WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW
INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY (1st ed. 1961 to 3d ed. 1993), which defined a "statement"
as "the act or process of stating, reciting, or presenting orally or on paper ... 2.
something stated: a: as a report or narrative... b: a single declaration or remark." Id.
at 526 n.5 (internal quotation marks omitted). A "statement" is also defined as "[a]
verbal assertion or nonverbal conduct intended as an assertion." BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 1416 (7th ed. 1999).
93. Fisher, 58 S.W.3d at 526.
94. Id.
9
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a report through Waste Management's surveillance videotapes.9 Had Fisher in
fact made a report through Waste Management's surveillance videotapes, such
conduct would qualify as a statement under the court's reading of the Webster's
definition.96
Although Fisher did not "knowingly or voluntarily"'97 participate in the
videotape surveillance, the majority found that Fisher's recorded conduct "gave
information." '98 Furthermore, the court noted that neither the dictionary
definition," nor Section 287.215, is so limited as to exclude involuntary reports
or statements. 10 Moreover, the court observed that a statement in writing covers
"any statement which is mechanically or electronically recorded, or taken as a
writing by another person, or otherwise preserved." '' This language, the court
stated, "clearly cover[s] a statement.., made without [Fisher's] knowledge." 2
Consequently, the court held that because Fisher's "conduct, as recorded on the
videotape, gave information,"' 3 the surveillance videotapes were areport.' ° As
such, the court concluded that Fisher's report-his conduct captured on the
surveillance videotapes-was a statement under Section 287.215, citing the
Chinese proverb that pictures "are worth more than 10,000 words."'05
Following its analysis of the legislative intent of Section 287.215, the court
next examined the legislative purpose with respect to a "statement" within the
entirety of the statutory scheme. 6 The court found that including videotape
surveillance within the meaning of "statement," "fits the legislative purpose as
discerned from the statutory scheme as a whole."' 7 The court stated that the
purpose of the workers' compensation proceeding is to provide "expeditious and
simple means of compensation."'0 8 Because discovery relies chiefly on injury
and physician reports, the court further found that the statute is designed to




98. Id. at 527.
99. Id. at 526; see supra text accompanying note 92.
100. Fisher, 58 S.W.3d at 526.




105. Id. (citing State ex rel. Mo. Pac. R.R. Co. v. Koehr, 853 S.W.2d 925, 925
(Mo. 1993)).
106. Fisher, 58 S.W.3d at 527.
107. Id.
108. Id. (citing Saint Lawrence v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 8 S.W.3d 143, 149
(Mo. Ct. App. 1999)).
[Vol. 67
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of most claims."'0 9 Holding that a videotape is not a "statement," the court
noted, would be "inconsistent" with the statute's general purpose." ° To do so
would allow an employer to withhold a surveillance videotape, encourage
hearings, and discourage settlement.'
B. The Dissent
In his dissent, Chief Justice Limbaugh began by stating that the "dictionary
definition of 'statement' cannot be stretched to accommodate the majority's
policy preference that [a statement] should [mean] the same" thing under Section
287.215 as it does under Section 287.560.11 Recognizing that although the
majority correctly stated Missouri's rule for deriving legislative intent, Chief
Justice Limbaugh argued that the majority nonetheless "rewrites the statute."'"1 3
Moreover, Chief Justice Limbaugh asserted that the majority "cavalierly tosses
aside""' 4 the court's analysis in Koehr that held that the dictionary definition of
statement was "at variance"' ' with the definition in Rule 56.01 which expressly
includes "video, motion picture or other recording . . . of the party."'" 6
Furthermore, ChiefJustice Limbaugh stated that the majority "unhesitatingly"" 7
reversed the Eastern District's holding that the term "statement" under Section
287.215 did not include non-auditory surveillance videotapes."'
After repeating the dictionary definitions of "statement" that were cited by
the majority,"9 Chief Justice Limbaugh observed that a statement's "overriding
theme" is "an affirmative act of communication in words, either oral or




112. Id. at 527-28 (Limbaugh, C.J., dissenting).
113. Id. at 528 (Limbaugh, C.J., dissenting). Missouri's rule regarding statutory
interpretation is that legislative intent is "derived from the statute's words 'used in their
plain and ordinary meaning."' Id. (Limbaugh, C.J., dissenting) (citing Budding v. SSM
Healthcare Sys., 19 S.W.3d 678, 680 (Mo. 2000)).
114. Id. (Limbaugh, C.J., dissenting).
115. Id. (Limbaugh, C.J., dissenting).
116. Id. (Limbaugh, C.J., dissenting). For the definition of"statement"under Rule
56.01, see supra note 34 and accompanying text.
117. Fisher, 58 S.W.3d at 528 (Limbaugh, C.J., dissenting).
118. Id. (Limbaugh, C.J., dissenting).
119. Id.; see supra text accompanying note 92.
120. Fisher, 58 S.W.3d at 528 (Limbaugh, C.J., dissenting); see also Fisher, No.
ED 78091, 2001 WL 69249, at *4 (Mo. Ct. App. Jan. 30,2001) (finding that under Rule
56.01 the definition of "statement," in the evidentiary context, includes an "assertion" or
11
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"a 'statement' by being filmed surreptitiously while engaged in conduct that was
neither intended as a communication,"'' nor could be so construed.',
Moreover, Chief Justice Limbaugh asserted that in order to characterize Fisher's
conduct as a report, it must necessarily "be intended to report, and it must be a
report in words."'" Finally, Chief Justice Limbaugh stated that the "non-
assertive, unspoken and unwritten conduct" 24 captured on Waste Management's
surveillance videotape "is simply not a 'statement' in the 'plain and ordinary
meaning' of the term."'" Consequently, Chief Justice Limbaugh concluded that
a non-auditory surveillance videotape is "not a 'statement' within the meaning
of Section 287.215.1126
V. COMMENT
In holding that a "statement" under Section 287.215 includes non-auditory
surveillance videotapes, the majority of the Missouri Supreme Court indeed
rewrote the statute. 27  The following will demonstrate that the court's
interpretation of a "statement" was simply inconsistent with the statutory
language and purpose of Section 287.215. The resulting conclusion agrees with
the Eastern District's holding and Chief Justice Limbaugh's dissent, and
concludes that a non-auditory surveillance videotape is not a statement within the
meaning of Section 287.215.
A. The Construction and Scope of Section 287.215
As paramount to this Note, the language of Section 287.215 demands
further examination. Section 287.215 provides:
No statement in writing made or given by an injured employee,
whether taken and transcribed by a stenographer... or any statement
"conduct intended as an assertion," is more broad and inclusive than the ordinary
dictionary meaning of statement used in Section 287.215); Erbschloe v. Gen. Motors,
823 S.W.2d 117,119 (Mo. Ct. App. 1992) (Stephan, J., concurring) (statingthat although
a videotape may be nonverbal conduct, an employee who is unaware that his employer
is videotaping his actions does not intend to assert those actions, and, therefore, an
employee's non-assertive conduct cannot constitute a statement under Section 287.215).
121. Fisher, 58 S.W.3d at 528 (Limbaugh, C.J., dissenting).
122. Id. (Limbaugh, C.J., dissenting).
123. Id. (Limbaugh, C.J., dissenting).
124. Id. (Limbaugh, C.J., dissenting).
125. Id. (Limbaugh, C.J., dissenting).
126. Id. (Limbaugh, C.J., dissenting).
127. See id. (Limbaugh, C.J., dissenting).
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which is mechanically or electronically recorded . . . shall be
admissible in evidence... unless a copy thereof is given or furnished
[to] the employee.'28
There is a common theme within this statute: Section 287.215 requires an
affirmative verbal statement made or given by an employee. A verbal statement
does not necessarily implicate oral or vocal communication. Rather, "verbal"
relates to an expression of words.2 Supporting this interpretation, the first
phrase of Section287.215 clearly provides for those statements-expressions of
words-that have been reduced to written form. Indeed, this is evident from the
statutory language that provides for methods of recording such verbal statements
by reference to a stenographer. Furthermore, the second phrase of Section
287.215 implicates those statements-expressions of words-that have not been
reduced to written form. Included are those statements that have been
"mechanically or electronically recorded."' 30  For example, an electronic
recording includes a tape recording of an employee's statement of his or her
physical condition. This phrase illustrates the process of affixing an employee's
verbal statement to atangible medium. Accordingly, Section 287.215 seemingly
applies to verbal statements given or made by an employee, whether written or
recorded by some other means.
As the court correctly recognized, absent an internal statutory definition,
legislative intent is derived from the plain and ordinary meaning of a statutory
term.' This is the meaning of the term presumed by the legislators at the
enactment of the legislation.' Relying on the 1950 edition of Webster's
Dictionary, the majority found that a statement is an "[a]ct of stating, reciting,
or presenting, orally or on paper... [t]hat which is stated; an embodiment in
words; ... a... report."' Based on this definition, the plain and ordinary
meaning of a statement sounds clear. A statement is a verbal expression of
words conveying information, whether written, oral, or otherwise presented,
regardless of form. Indeed, the majority's definition verifies the verbal nature
of a "statement" by specifying a"reciting... orally or on paper," and that which
is "an embodiment of words.' 34 Accordingly, the definition upon which the
128. Mo. REv. STAT. § 287.215 (2000).
129. "Verbal" is defined as "[o]f, relating to, or expressed in words." BLACK'S
LAW DICTIONARY 1554 (7th ed. 1999).
130. Mo. REV. STAT. § 287.215 (2000).
131. Fisher, 58 S.W.3d at 526; see also In re Beyersdorfer, 59 S.W.3d 523, 525
(Mo. 2001); Maudlin v. Lang, 867 S.W.2d 514, 516 (Mo. 1993).
132. Fisher, 58 S.W.3d at 526.
133. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
134. Id.; see supra note 92 and accompanying text.
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maj ority based its interpretation precludes the type of non-verbal conduct at issue
in the instant case.
The court's reliance on Fisher's conduct as a"report"'35 is similarly flawed.
According to the court's definition, a "report" necessarily implicates "that which
is stated."' 36 This implies that a report is a statement-a verbal expression of
words. As previously noted, Fisher's non-verbal physical conduct was not a
statement within the court's definition. Accordingly, reliance on Fisher's
physical conduct as a report is inconsistent with the plain and ordinary meaning
of statement because Fisher's conduct was not an expression in words; it was not
a report, and, therefore, not a statement as defined by the court.
The plain and ordinary meaning ofa "statement" is simply inconsistent with
the majority's interpretation of the meaning of statement under Section 287.215.
A statement is a verbal expression of words; the plain understanding of a
"statement" cannot be so construed as to include a surreptitious surveillance
videotape depicting Fisher's physical conduct. Such physical conduct captured
on surveillance videotape is not a verbal statement because there are no
expressed words. While the conduct may be later described in words, the actor
is not "making or giving"'137 a statement. Indeed, there is no verbal expression
connected to, or contained within, Waste Management's videotape of Fisher.
Rather, the viewer of the videotape must infer certain information from the non-
verbal conduct presented on the videotape. For example, an interpretation of an
actor's condition as "healthy" is based on observed conduct that requires the
viewer to make an assessment from the actor's observable physical condition.
This assessment is intuitively one step removed from the actor verbally stating
that he is, in fact, "healthy." Arguably, had Waste Management recorded
Fisher's auditory statements on the surveillance videotape, those auditory
expressions would constitute "statements" by Fisher. A non-auditory visual
recording of Fisher's physical conduct, however, is simply not a statement
according to the majority's own definition.
Further supporting this contention is the notion that conduct recorded
without an actor's knowledge is non-affirmative-without an intent to
communicate. While the court states that neither Section 287.215 nor the
dictionary definition is "so limited"'3 as to exclude statements made "without
the claimant's knowledge,"' 39 the court cites no authority for this proposition."4
135. See Fisher, 58 S.W.3d at 526.
136. Id.; see also supra note 92 and accompanying text.
137. See Mo. REV. STAT. § 287.215 (2000).
138. Fisher, 58 S.W.3d at 526.
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One cannot, however, "unwillingly or unwittingly"'' engage in the affirmative
"[a]ct of stating" any more than one can unintentionally do anything with the
purpose of doing so.' 42 The plain and ordinary meaning of "statement," as
enacted by the Missouri legislature, therefore, simply does not support the
majority's conclusion that a non-auditory surveillance videotape depicting
Fisher's physical conduct is an affirmative statement within the meaning of
Section 287.215.
The statutory language of Section 287.215 is not ambiguous, however, and
provides a plain meaning upon which the court chose not to rely. While it may
be desirable to employ a consistent meaning of "statement" throughout Chapter
287, such a task is for the legislature. The court must, therefore, apply an
unambiguous statute, not construct a new one. 43
B. The Policy of Section 287.215
As stated by the majority, the discovery mechanisms of the workers'
compensation law are designed to provide "expeditious and simple means of
compensation for injuries suffered in the course of employment."'" These
141. Id. at 526.
142. Id.; see supra note 92 and accompanying text.
143. See, e.g., Opponents ofPrison Site, Inc. v. Carnahan, 994 S.W.2d 573, 578-79
(Mo. Ct. App. 1999) ("courts are without authority to read into a statute a legislative
intent contrary to the intent made evident by the plain language"); Bosworth v. Sewell,
918 S.W.2d 773,777 (Mo. 1996) ("where there is not ambiguity, [the court] cannot look
to any other rule of construction"); Metro Auto Auction v. Director of Revenue, 707
S.W.2d 397,401 (Mo. 1986) ('where the language is clear and unambiguous, there is no
room for construction"); Bishop v. United Mo. Bank of Carthage, 647 S.W.2d 625, 629
(Mo. Ct. App. 1983) ("unambiguous statute should be taken to mean what it says, for the
General Assembly is presumed to have intended what the law states directly, and courts
have no leave to impose another meaning"); Mo. Div. of Employment Sec. v. Labor and
Indus. Relations Comm'n, 637 S.W.2d 315, 318 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982) (the "legislature
is presumed to have intended exactly what it states and if the language used in the statute
is clear and unambiguous, there is no room for construction"); State ex rel. Igoe v.
Bradford, 611 S.W.2d 343, 349 (Mo. Ct. App. 1980) ("if the provisions of a statute are
express and unambiguous, the court is not at liberty to construe the language in
accordance with the intentions of supporters or opponents of the legislation because the
court functions to enforce the law as it is written"); Chapman v. Sanders, 528 S.W.2d
462, 465 (Mo. Ct. App. 1975) ("when the language of a statute is unambiguous and
conveys plain and definite meaning, 'courts have no business foraging among such rules
to look for or impose another meaning').
144. Fisher, 58 S.W.3d at 527 (citing Saint Lawrence v. Trans World Airlines,
Inc., 8 S.W.3d 143, 149 (Mo. Ct. App. 1999)).
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discovery procedures are also intended to "avoid surprises."'45 The court's
ruling in Fisher, however, may produce the opposite result. Following Fisher,
an employer is required to disclose all non-auditory surveillance videotapes of
an employee upon a request for statements under either discovery section of the
workers' compensation statute.'46 This requirement may effectively reduce the
incentive, and create a disadvantage, for employers to obtain such information
through surveillance. As a result, an employer may no longer be able to impeach
the testimony of an employee, or corroborate its own testimony. Therefore,
employers may decide to stop taking surveillance video of employees who file
a compensation claim. This could, in effect, retard the workers' compensation
process by impeding the employer's ability to collect information, obtain a fair
decision, and distribute compensation.
Moreover, non-disclosure of a surveillance videotape upon request for all
statements would hardly impede an injured employee from obtaining expeditious
relief. As in the instant case, an employer is only likely to refuse disclosure of
surveillance videotapes upon request where the employee's testimony or
compensation filing was inconsistent with, or contrary to, the surveillance
videotape evidence. The employer would then use this evidence during the
compensation hearing to impeach the employee's fraudulent filing. Absent such
a contradiction, surveillance evidence may serve little purpose. Non-disclosure
in this instance would not impede an employee's need for economic relief,
because the need---compensation for the alleged but non-existent injury--does
not exist. Consequently, an employee denied relief based on such an
inconsistency does not require economic relief, for there is no injury, or the
injury is not as severe as the employee claims. Arguably, an employer may
withhold damaging surveillance evidence that corroborates the disastrous effect
of an accident. This argument is unpersuasive, however, because this evidence
would merely be superfluous in light of medical records and the apparent
physical condition of the employee.
Furthermore, without surveillance videotape evidence, the incidence of
fraudulent compensation claims could increase. The number of spurious filings
may rise given that the employer would be without important evidence needed
to refute those claims, or the extent of the injury. The facts of the instant case
support this contention. Relying on Waste Management's surveillance
videotape, the Commission significantly reduced the AL's injury finding. 47
145. Id.; cf. Wilkerson v. Prelutsky, 943 S.W.2d 643, 649 (Mo. 1997) ("The
purpose of discovery is not merely to prevent surprise at trial. An equally important
purpose is to narrow the issues and thereby facilitate a speedy and less expensive
disposition of the case.").
146. See supra notes 82-110 and accompanying text.
147. See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
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Absent that evidence, the ALJ and Commission must place more reliance on
conflicting medical evidence, creating more subjective findings."4 Arguably,
employers may not cease taking surveillance of an employee who has filed a
compensation claim. After all, under the new definition of "statement," the
employer would merely have to provide the videotape to the employee upon a
request for any statements prior to the compensation hearing.'49 Even in this
scenario, however, while the employee may then discover that the employer is
aware of the fraudulent claim, such a result does not further the court's goal of
providing a simple and expeditious means of compensation for an injured
employee. This is because compensation is determined at the hearing-the first
place during which the surveillance videotape may influence the ALJ's decision.
Consequently, pre-hearing disclosure of a surveillance videotape will have no
effect on the compensation that is determined at the compensation hearing.
In addition, mandating that employers disclose non-auditory surveillance
videotapes under Section 287.215 may not prevent surprise as desired by the
majority. Prevention of surprise was easily achieved with a request to produce
all statements under Section 287.560 pursuant to a subpoena duces tecum during
the deposition of the employer ° In other words, had Fisher desired disclosure
of the surveillance videotape, a procedure was readily available by which the
videotape was discoverable. There is nothing to suggest that a party seeking to
discover whether the employer has obtained surveillance videotape was
previously incapable of so doing or that he will necessarily take the proper steps
to do so now.
Furthermore, the only surprise an employee would encounter when
confronted with surveillance evidence is its very existence. This situation may
occur where the employee is unaware that surveillance videotapes exist. All of
the information conveyed through surveillance regarding the condition of the
employee, however, is presumably already known to that employee since one
certainly knows one's own physical condition. Discovery of a surveillance
videotape, therefore, would merely disclose what the employee already knew,
and evidence of which the employer is aware. Such a result prevents surprise to
no one. While such illumination may induce apre-hearing settlement, this alone
does not support the majority's liberal construction.
VI. CONCLUSION
As the Court of Appeals for the Eastern District of Missouri noted, "[t]here
is no authority for [the] proposition that a videotape with no audio portion
148. See supra note 21.
149. See supra notes 45-48 and accompanying text.
150. See supra notes 72-76 and accompanying text.
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constitutes a statement under Section 287.215."'' Indeed, the Fisher court
agreed, citing an ancient Chinese proverb that pictures "are worth more than
10,000 words."'52 In the words of the majority, "[t]he request for 'statements'
under section 287.215 is simple and straightforward."' 53 Equally as simple and
straightforward was the plain meaning of a statement under Missouri's two
workers' compensation discovery mechanisms. A request for statements
pursuant to a subpoena duces tecum includes a request for surveillance
videotapes; a request under Section 287.215 did not.
The Missouri Supreme Court's reasoning in Fisher might nonetheless be
reconciled. Essentially, the court simplified the workers' compensation
discovery process. Indeed, the court began its opinion by expressing a desire to
harmonize the scope of the two discovery mechanisms for economic and
practical reasons. 154  While stating that the "[c]onsideration of pragmatism,
consistency and convenience do not wholly govern [its] decision,"'5 5 these
factors ultimately appeared to persuade the court. While such a result seems
reasonable, the price is the detriment of statutory preeminence.
As a result of Fisher, an employer must now produce any videotaped
surveillance of an employee upon request under either Section 287.215 or
287.560. The employer's failure to do so will result in the surveillance
videotape being inadmissable at any hearing.
JASON C. RAHOY
151. Erbschloe v. Gen. Motors, 823 S.W.2d 117, 119 (Mo. Ct. App. 1992).
152. Fisher v. Waste Mgmt. of Mo., 58 S.W.3d 523, 527 (Mo. 2001) (citing State
ex rel. Mo. Pac. R.R. v. Koehr, 853 S.W.2d 925, 925 (Mo. 1993)). It should also be
noted that the only authority from which the Koehr court cites is from a case with Rule
56.01 at issue regarding Section 287.560, not Section 287.215. See id.
153. Id.
154. Id. Specifically, the court noted that, "a request for a statement under section
287.215 is far easier and less expensive than using the deposition and subpoena
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